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ABORTION AFTER WEBSTER
The most heralded decision of the 1988 Term was the abortion
decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. I After the decision came down on the last day of the Term, there was an avalanche
of public reaction. Pro-life forces heralded the decision as the demise of Roe v. Wade, while pro-choice advocates lamented the return to the pre-Roe era of "back alley abortions." Both responses
were exaggerated. Webster actually is notable as much for the
Court's caution and indecision as anything else. Though it may be
a sign of larger things to come, the decision itself actually made
only small changes in existing abortion law.
In addition, advocates on both sides of the issue may have
overestimated the ability of the legal system to suppress abortion.
A recent study by a leading expert in criminal law suggests that, no
matter what the Supreme Court does, the effect on the number of
abortions is likely to be minimal.
Four provisions of the Missouri abortion statute were before
the Supreme Court in Webster. The Court found it unnecessary to
pass on two provisions-a preamble declaring that human life begins at conception and a prohibition on the use of public funds to
encourage abortion. Two other provisions were reviewed on the
merits and upheld. One of these barred abortions by public employees or at public hospitals. The other required viability testing for
abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy.
In assessing the impact of Webster, the starting place is obviously the opinions themselves. The lead opinion was written by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and was joined in its entirety by Justices
White and Kennedy. He was also joined by O'Connor and Scalia,
making his the majority opinion, on three points: First, the
"human life" preamble might raise constitutional issues depending
on how it was applied by the state courts, but since its future application was entirely speculative, the question was not ripe for decision. Second, limiting abortions by government employees or at
government hospitals was constitutional. This provision did not
place any new barrier in the way of a woman seeking an abortion,
but rather denied her the affirmative assistance of the government in
obtaining the abortion. Hence, this provision did not violate Roe,
I.
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which only prohibits the government from adding to the woman's
burdens. Third, the dispute about the ban on the use of government
funds for abortion counseling was moot, because the plaintiffs had
essentially decided not to pursue it on appeal.
Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke only for a plurality on what
turned out to be the crucial issue in the case, that of viability testing. The statute was somewhat ambiguous in its terms. The first
sentence of the statute says that whenever a doctor has reason to
believe that the fetus is older than nineteen weeks, "the physician
shall first determine if the unborn child is viable "using . . . that
degree of care ... commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful ...
physician." The second sentence goes on to say that "[i]n making
this determination of viability, the physician shall perform" tests for
fetal age, weight, and lung maturity. The ambiguity concerns
whether the tests are mandatory. The second sentence seems to say
that certain tests must always be performed. The first sentence can
be read to leave the doctor discretion based on reasonable medical
judgment.
Rehnquist adopted the less restrictive reading, under which the
doctor does not need to test if he determines that the tests would be
"irrelevant to determining viability or even dangerous to the mother
and the fetus .... " Given this reading, Rehnquist found the statute
to be reasonable. While a 20-week fetus is not viable, there is a
four-week zone of uncertainty in determining the length of pregnancy, and a 24-week fetus might be viable. But even though it was
reasonable, the statute conflicted with Roe in Rehnquist's view, because it frequently burdened abortions where in fact the fetus was
not viable, thereby violating the Roe trimester system. (Under the
trimester system, the state can regulate abortions to protect potential human life only in the third trimester of pregnancy.)
This brings us to the crucial portion of Rehnquist's opinion, his
rejection of the Roe trimester system. He rejected the trimester system because it spawned "a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a
body of constitutional doctrine." Also, the state's interest in preserving potential life does not spring into existence at the point of
viability, but exists throughout pregnancy. The woman's right to
abortion cannot be balanced against fetal life "once and for all by
reference only to the calendar."
Does this mean that Roe is overruled? Clearly, no--or at least,
not yet. In the penultimate paragraph of the opinion, Rehnquist
pointed out that Webster is distinguishable from Roe because Missouri banned abortions only after viability. "This case therefore af-
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fords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe ... and we leave it
undisturbed."
There is even some language in Rehnquist's opinion that seems
to reaffirm Roe, or at least the basic holding that the right to abortion enjoys some constitutional protection. Consider the following
two passages:
The experience of the Court in applying Roe v. Wade in later cases suggests to us
that there is wisdom in not necessarily attempting to elaborate the abstract differences between a "fundamental right" to abortion. as the Court described it in Akron, a "limited fundamental constitutional right." which Justice Blackmun's dissent
today treats Roe as having established, or a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause. which we believe it to be.

•••

The dissent's suggestion that legislative bodies, in a Nation where more than half of
our population is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact
abortion regulation reminiscent of the dark ages not only misreads our views but
does scant justice to those who serve in such bodies and the people who elected
them. [citations deleted, emphasis added].

Look again at what Rehnquist was saying. First, abortion is "a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Second, allowing complete bans on abortion "misreads our views." In short,
it seems, Rehnquist recognized some sort of constitutional right to
abortion.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion did not go even as far
as Rehnquist's. She agreed with him that viability testing is required by the statute only where consistent with good medical practice. Given that reading, she found no conflict with the Roe
trimester system, and therefore no reason to reevaluate that system.
"No decision of this Court has held that the State may not directly
promote its interest in potential life when viability is possible. Quite
the contrary." In short, she said, "[i]t is clear to me that requiring
the performance of examinations and tests useful to determining
whether a fetus is viable, when viability is possible, and when it
would not be medically imprudent to do so, does not impose an
undue burden on a woman's abortion decision."
Of all the Justices, only Scalia spoke in favor of a direct overruling of Roe. He lambasted his fellow conservatives for avoiding
the issue. He agreed with the dissent that Rehnquist's opinion "effectively would overrule Roe v. Wade." He added: "I think that
should be done, but would do it more explicitly. Since today we
contrive to avoid doing it, and indeed to avoid almost any decision
of national import, I need not set forth my reasons .... " The tone
of Scalia's concurrence is harsh-as harsh as one might have expected from a dissenting, not concurring, opinion. He said that
O'Connor's views in her concurring opinion "cannot be taken seri-
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ously." He was only slightly gentler about Rehnquist's approach.
"The result of our vote today is that only minor problematical aspects of Roe will be reconsidered, unless one expects State legislatures to adopt provisions whose compliance with Roe cannot even
be argued with a straight face." He closed by saying that the Court
had taken the "least responsible" possible approach to the case.
Justice Blackmon's dissent begins by saying that Roe and "the
fundamental constitutional right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are not secure." "Never in my
memory," he said, "has a plurality announced a judgment of this
Court that so foments disregard for the law and for our standing
decisions." And so, he said, "I fear for the future. I fear for the
liberty and equality of the millions of women who have lived and
come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided. I fear for the
integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court." Justice Blackmun
then criticized the Court's handling of the viability issue and defended at length the approach adopted by the Court in Roe. He was
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. He rejected Rehnquist's reading of the viability provision, and argued instead that it
required viability testing even where testing would be pointless or
dangerous. He also argued that the "human life" declaration violated the establishment clause of the Constitution, because it was
only based on a theological view about the beginning of life.
At this point, perhaps it is worth "counting heads" with respect to the current status of Roe. Four Justices (the dissenters)
would uphold Roe. Justice O'Connor is silent on the issue. Three
Justices (the plurality) want to modify the trimester system but
seem to recognize some possible constitutional right to an abortion.
Only one Justice (Scalia) wants to throw Roe on the scrap heap.
As to the specific issues in the case, the direct impact of the
decision is minor. The Court did not make much new law in its
ruling about abortions by public facilities and employees. The
Court had previously held that public financing could be denied for
abortions; Webster merely took that holding one step further in a
predictable direction. The viability-testing provision may well be
consistent with Roe, as Justice O'Connor argued. Even if it is not, it
has little practical importance. Less than one percent of all abortions are performed after the twentieth week, and even then, the
statute requires viability testing only when the physician finds it to
be medically justifiable.
Although the press billed Webster as a tremendous victory for
pro-life sources, it could equally well have been called a startling
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defeat. They obtained precisely one vote to overrule Roe outright.
Justice O'Connor, whose vote is clearly necessary if Roe is to be
overruled, seemed to be very anxious indeed to avoid that step.
Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy seemed surprisingly gingerly in
their handling of the issue, and even-as I noted earlier-can be
read to be reaffirming some aspects of Roe. Indeed, as a technical
matter, Roe is completely unmodified. Since there were only four
votes to modify it in any respect, it remains binding on lower court
judges.
How did this get to be a "big win" for the pro-life movement?
Everyone outside the Court had an interest in exaggerating the effect of the case. Pro-life advocates wanted to be able to claim a big
victory. Pro-choice advocates wanted to rally the troops. And the
press wanted the decision to be as exciting as possible. These interests all converged in the direction of "hyping" the impact of
Webster.
This is not to say that the future of Roe is secure. After announcing the decision in Webster, the Court granted cert. in three
cases involving other aspects of abortion regulation. These cases
give the Court another opportunity to whittle away at abortion
rights. They also give Justice Scalia another opportunity to try to
sell his colleagues on more drastic action. If anything, however, his
jabs at O'Connor may well backfire, making her less likely to move
in his direction.
My crystal ball is no better than yours, but I see no reason to
expect the Court to abolish the constitutional right to abortion in
these cases. What I do expect-and what almost everyone has expected for at least the past three years-is that the Court will allow
greater state regulation (not including complete bans on abortion).
If President Bush gets to make some additional appointments, perhaps the balance of power will shift in Scalia's direction. Or perhaps not. A Bush appointee might well share some of the qualms
that Kennedy and O'Connor seem to feel about a total overruling of
Roe. Stevens and Blackmun, let us recall, were also Republican
appointees.
Even if Roe is overruled someday, abortions-for better or
worse-will not come to a halt. According to a Newsweek poll,
only 17 percent of the public favors a complete ban on abortion.
Newsweek also counted at least ten states that are unlikely to restrict abortion in the near future, so women who can afford a bus
ride to those states will still be able to get abortions.
Moreover, even a total ban on abortions might be relatively
ineffective. John Kaplan is one of the nation's leading criminal law
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experts. In a recent article, he contends that abortion bans can be
expected to have minimal effects, even apart from the likelihood of
interstate travel to get abortions. The most reliable studies show
that the number of illegal abortions before Roe was about 75 percent of the number of legal abortions now. Today, illegal abortions
would be much safer and cheaper, because the technology for performing abortions has improved greatly since Roe. Criminal enforcement of abortion laws was always very difficult, and would be
more difficult today because of broad public support for abortion.
For these reasons, Professor Kaplan contends, bans on abortion
would be largely a symbolic victory for the pro-life groups, but
would have limited practical effects.2
Restrictive abortion laws would prevent some abortions, and
they would place a heavy psychological (and sometimes economic)
burden on women who obtain abortions despite those laws. The
importance of symbolism on such fundamental issues also should
not be underestimated. But the true stakes are less than both sides
of the dispute claim.
In any event, we are a long way from a constitutional regime in
which complete bans on abortion will be allowed. Apart from Justice Scalia, no one on the Supreme Court seems to be in any hurry
to get there.
D.A.F.3

2. For those of you who would like to read his fascinating article in full, the citation is
Kaplan, "Abortion as a Vice Crime: A 'What If' Story," 51 LAW AND CoNTEMP. PROB. 151
(1988).
3. An earlier version of this essay appeared in Trial magazine. Reprinted with the
permission of Trial. Copyright 1989 Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America.

